IMPROVEMENT MEASURES RECOMMENDED

The application of biometric technologies, such as a fingerprint scanner used for access control purposes, may well serve as a useful security system. However, in the context of the workplace its use in employee monitoring means that it has the propensity to be privacy intrusive. In such circumstances the recording of fingerprints is a sensitive matter given the widespread association of fingerprints with criminal investigations undertaken by the police.

One of the important considerations employers should take into account when deploying such a device is whether the same purpose may be achieved by less privacy intrusive means. Where there are other pragmatic alternatives, these should be resorted to although the preference for non-privacy invasive systems does not automatically disqualify the use of a fingerprint recognition system for legitimate purposes. Valid reasons may exist for employing such a system e.g. controlling access of personnel to a secure location.

The university responded positively to the PCPD's advice and introduced a new PIN system which effectively served the same purpose.

IMPROVEMENT MEASURES RECOMMENDED

The airline took the view that the collection of credit card copies was not excessive and therefore declined to stop such collection. The explanation provided was that the collection of the copy was for the purposes of verifying the credit card information completed by the customers and preventing unlawful or seriously improper conduct. The PCPD sought the assistance of the global credit card issuers who confirmed that, for off-line transactions (i.e. an order by fax or mail), the "chargeback rule" would apply meaning that the merchant would be required to bear the risk. That is, a dispute subsequently initiated by a cardholder would result in the chargeback rule being invoked in favour of the cardholder. Even if the merchant were to produce a copy of the individual credit card, it would not help the merchant in having the money reimbursed by the card-issuing bank.

The PCPD presented this rationale to the airline.

The airline agreed to stop collection of customers' credit card copies in transactions where no physical card was presented. The revised policy of the airline necessitated systems adjustments which are now in place and applicable to their international operations.

IMPROVEMENT MEASURES RECOMMENDED

Local newspapers reported that a bank had collected from non-account holders their Hong Kong Identity Card("HKIC") copies, their addresses and contact details when purchasing gift cheques from the bank. The PCPD approached the Hong Kong Monetary Authority ("the HKMA") to seek clarification as to whether such collection was required pursuant to the Guideline on Prevention of Money Laundering ("the Guideline") issued by the HKMA. The HKMA confirmed that although there was no specific guideline in respect of the gift cheque business, a customer purchasing a gift cheque from a bank would normally be regarded as an applicant for "business". According to paragraph 5.26 of the Guideline with respect to business transactions undertaken for non-account holders, banks are required to seek positive evidence of identity from applicants and keep copies of their identification documents when the transaction undertaken involves large sums of cash, or is considered unusual.

The bank was approached again by the PCPD who expressed the view that even if they relied upon paragraph 5.26 of the Guideline, the PCPD had certain reservations as to whether the purchase of gift cheques, which would not normally involve large sums of cash, could be regarded as a transaction covered by the paragraph.

The bank agreed to revise their practices and in future, they will not collect HKIC copies from non-account holders buying gift cheques unless the amount of a single purchase exceeds HK$100,000.

IMPROVEMENT MEASURES RECOMMENDED

As the client was a corporate entity, collection of the director's Hong Kong Identity Card copy was considered unnecessary. On learning of the incident, the PCPD contacted the mobile phone service company to enquire about both the case in question and the company's guidelines in handling such matters. It transpired that an individual opening an account was required to provide a copy of his identity card, irrespective of whether the account was in the name of a company or an individual.

After the PCPD's involvement, the mobile phone service company agreed to amend its policy such that individuals opening a company account would no longer be required to furnish copies of their identity cards.

IMPROVEMENT MEASURES RECOMMENDED

During the reporting period the PCPD continued to monitor and sample job advertisements published in newspapers and major recruitment magazines. Warning letters were issued to those advertisers who placed blind recruitment advertisements and, where the same blind recruitment advertisement was repeated, a compliance check was undertaken. The PCPD identified suspect employers and advertisers with the help of the publishers and proceeded to raise the issue with those concerned, requesting them to take immediate remedial action.

To date, 48 compliance checks have been undertaken. There was no evidence in the checks undertaken that the advertisements constituted an act of dishonesty designed to obtain job seekers' information for unlawful purposes (e.g. to perpetrate a fraud). Prospective employers were genuinely ignorant of the requirements of the Code of Practice on Human Resource Management ("the Code").

Upon being informed of the provisions of the Code the majority of employers ceased placing blind recruitment advertisements.

IMPROVEMENT MEASURES RECOMMENDED

In February 2005 the PCPD received enquiries from the press, and members of the public, expressing concern about possible intrusion of personal data privacy arising from a new service provided by a fixed telecommunications network service company ("the telephone company") in disclosing subscribers' telephone numbers and address information to the Fire Services Department ("FSD"). The purpose of disclosing this information is to enable the FSD to respond efficiently to emergency calls.

The PCPD approached the telephone company and the FSD to ensure that, where this disclosure involved personal data, it was in compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance. Both parties indicated that the telephone company would only provide the FSD with the telephone numbers and installation addresses i.e. the building or estate from which an emergency call had been made. The full address and name of the subscriber would not be disclosed to the FSD.

According to section 2 of the Ordinance, "personal data" means any data relating directly or indirectly to a living individual and from which it is practicable for the identity of the individual to be directly or indirectly ascertained. As the information disclosed by the telephone company to the FSD did not contain any personal identifying particulars it did not fall within the definition of "personal data" stipulated by the Ordinance.

The FSD also explained that the practice of calling back the caller, relying upon the displayed number, was not the most effective way to respond to emergency calls. In an emergency time is of critical importance and the caller may not be able to clearly relay information such as an address due to extreme anxiety or other circumstances. In view of this, the prompt retrieval of the caller's installation address would enable the FSD to accurately identify the incident location and respond to the call more efficiently.

Staff of the PCPD later paid a visit to the FSD's Command and Control Centre and were satisfied that no personal data were transferred from the telephone company to the FSD in this new service.

N.B. The Office of the Telecommunications Authority ("OFTA") approached the PCPD in 2002 regarding the unblocking of Calling Name Display ("CNAMD")[1] data on FSD emergency hotlines. At that time the PCPD took the view that it would be prudent for subscribers to be notified at the time of their subscription to the CNAMD service that all blocking options would not be available for calls made to FSD emergency hotlines.

[1] Insofar as CNAMD and related services are concerned, OFTA has issued a Code of Practice on Calling Line Identification and Other Calling Line Identification Related Services ("the Code") to be followed by the telecommunications industry. Since CNAMD discloses the name of an individual, the Code requires prior registration with the operator and the written authorization and consent of the person whose name will be displayed to the called party when making calls from the subscribed telephone line.